deportation that had blighted the lives of undocumented migrants for decades, the President offered those who had been in the U.S. for more than five years the opportunity to 'stay in the country temporarily' and 'get right with the law.' 3 As part of his discursive ploy to placate both conservative and liberal critics of his immigration record to date, the President made the undocumented migrants out to be, for all other intents and purposes, Americans already: hard working, God-fearing, patriotic breadwinners, like the immigrants of old. 4 He counted himself in the lineage of deserving newcomers of golden olden days: 'Millions of us, myself included, go back generations in this country, with ancestors who put in the painstaking work to become citizens. So we don't like the notion that anyone might get a free pass to American citizenship.' 5 In adopting, for that passage of the speech, the mask of a white Republican, Obama subtly reminded his audience of the white American credentials his mixed African/American heritage bestows him with, and which sets him apart from African American descendants of slaves. Media reporting in the U.K. and U.S. failed to note this, however, and focused instead on the President's appeal to American identity and values in his decision to defer deportation of illegal immigrants: ´it's not who we are as Americans . . . we were strangers once, too.' And this was significant too, because the inclusive 'we' that hinted at the President's own recent (African) and more distant (white Mid Western) immigrant descent, was immigration discourse is insightfully analysed in Margaret E. Dorsey and Miguel Díaz-Barriga's 'Senator Barack Obama and Immigration Reform.' 3 Ibid. 4 Or like the new neoliberal subjects David Cisneros describes, who are 'produced through discourses about values, competence, hard work, and respectability-all of which become indexed to whiteness.' Cisneros, 'A Nation of Immigrants,' 5. 5 Obama, 'Remarks by the President,' n.p. a departure from a more familiar Presidential discourse of 'us' and 'them,' invoking a residual nativism or merely a fear of the foreign.
Third however, even as he distanced himself from his predecessor in a conciliatory approach to 'unlawful' immigrants and in his appeal to 'who we are,' Obama also strategically invoked the ghost of George W. Bush to placate immigration hawks in both parties. 6 Whereas Bush's policies on immigration notoriously included a strengthening of border patrol and the building of a 670 mile fence to deter migrants crossing from Mexico, Obama quoted him to lend credence to his own gospel of diversity and inclusivity. 7 Indeed, President Obama's closing sentiment, 'My fellow Americans, we are and always will be a nation of immigrants,' epitomised the paradox of American national identity ('fellow Americans'/'nation of immigrants') and the contradictions of bipartisan discourse on immigration that is this essay's central conundrum. It echoed the programmatic opening line of a 2008 report from the Task Force on New Americans to President George W. Bush: 'The United States has been since its founding, and continues to be, a nation of immigrants,' which proposed a very different immigration agenda from that outlined in Obama's speech. 8 The Task Force had been charged by the President to design a policy for the 6 We would be mistaken to think Obama's Executive Order typifies a reversal of his predecessor's immigration policy. Dorsey and Díaz-Barriga note his conservative emphasis on 'earned citizenship,' and write 'his rhetoric looks like that of President Bush. 97 . Cisneros goes further and explains that, partly by means of devolving immigration control to states and local programmes such as Secure Communities, Obama's 'represents one of the strictest enforcement regimes in decades, including record numbers of deportations, more Border Control personnel, heightened use of surveillance technologies, and increased fence construction.' Cisneros,' A Nation of Immigrants,' 3. Department of Homeland Security 'to help legal immigrants embrace the common core of American civic culture, learn our common language, and fully become Americans.' 9 Not concerned then with 'illegal,' but with legal immigrants to the United States, the Report remains a startling document in that it expresses the Bush administration's concern about the purported un-Americanness of recent legal newcomers; by example of the now almost forgotten Americanisation movement of a century before, the remedy it proposes is 'Americanization for the 21 st century.' 10 Where Obama thus conceived of undocumented migrants as Americans in vitrowork ethic, family values, regular religious worship and all-Bush saw even legal immigrants as unwilling or unable-to-integrate outsiders, in need of 'help' to adopt or adapt to the American way. Both presidents, however, strategically deployed the idea that 'we are and always have been a nation of immigrants' to legitimise their respective stances on immigration reform. That they could do so unchallenged and government website, http://www.uscis.gov/archive/archive-news/fact-sheetbuilding-americanization-movement-21st-century-report-president-united-statestask-force-new-americans; a PDF of the full text can still be found in the archive on www.uscis.gov. 9 Ibid., iv. The Report was the result of 2 years of consultation and historiographical research and involved a wide range of organisations and interest groups from across the political spectrum. Its status today is unclear; published after the election of Barack Obama, the Report became irrelevant as soon as it appeared-which is not to say that it may not be brought to life again should a Republican be elected President in 2016. 10 Space does not permit a detailed comparison between the twentieth century campaign and this proposal for Americanisation in the twenty-first. That there ever was a concerted, top-down, nation-wide programme for Americanisation of new immigrants is today known only by specialists such as immigration historians and social scientists. Media and political discourse routinely ignore it and refer to 'Americanisation' as an organic, inevitable process of immigrant adaptation to life in the U.S., part of the nation's story of progress over the twentieth century.
with equal conviction raises all sorts of questions about the cross-party appeal of the 'nation of immigrants' rhetoric, its ability to embrace constituencies of Americans with conflicting stances on immigration, and last not least its accuracy as a descriptor of American national identity. What does the now apparently consensual idea that the U.S. is 'a nation of immigrants' say about contemporary American identity? What does it say about American immigration and its troubled history, for that matter?
Where did the concept originate and how does it inform, or necessitate (as it did, according to the Bush Task The answer to these questions is not straightforward, because we are concerned discourses that purport to address a national identity in the very act of creating it as an ideological entity. In order to reveal the contradictions disguised by the notion of the 'nation of immigrants,' it is my aim first to deconstruct its rhetorical power and then to trace how the official discourse of American nationhood changed from '100% Americanism' in 1915 to 'a nation of immigrants' a century later, with apparently equal self-evidence. Then, it is also my task to investigate what hides, unofficially, behind those banners of a homogeneous nationalism on one hand, and unity in ethnic diversity on the other. I am thus concerned to analyse Presidential discourse as it seeks to endorse policies legitimising immigrants as potential true Americans, whilst disavowing the cultural difference they bring with them, whether they be Theodore Roosevelt's Americanisation movement, echoed in the report of G.W. Bush's Task Force, or Presidentially sanctioned legal measures to redeem the deserving illegal immigrant, as in Obama's executive action of November 2014. 11 But I am also interested in what happens to cultural differences in the processes of Americanisation and ethnicisation in everyday life, through public schooling, employment, trade unionism and civic engagement before World War II, and through expansion of higher education and exposure to American media and the culture of consumption after it. 12 Praxis may well conflict with principle, after all. My hypothesis throughout is that, contrary to appearances and in light of its factual inaccuracy, today's 'nation of immigrants' is the paradoxical product of twentieth century Americanisation, and has its origin not in ethnic pride but in immigrant shame-and racist exclusion.
The trouble with 'a nation of immigrants'
Inclusive in its implication of ethnic diversity and affirming-or so it seems-the U.S.'s exceptional status as a refuge for all, 'we are a nation of immigrants' has become so familiar a slogan that the ideological work it continues to do has long since become obscured by the statement's prima facie truth. President's clear allusion to racial difference in this last phrase and his pointed inclusion of himself in the national 'we' as the son of an African immigrant now, the idea of African Americans as erstwhile 'immigrants' or 'strangers' who were 'welcomed' and 'taught' anything other than their innate and indelible inferiority is preposterous. 16 And it is more so coming from an African American President:
13 Obama, 'Remarks,'n.p. 14 Roger Daniels argues in his well-known history of American immigration that Africans can and indeed should be regarded as 'immigrants,' on the grounds that doing so would merge the history of slavery and the African diaspora with immigration history to mutual benefit. Although I accept his reasoning, to advocate recognition of slaves as 'immigrants' as a condition for better integrated historiography is to sacrifice the political importance of the distinction between forced migration and that of free labour. See Daniels, Coming to America, Obama, 'Remarks by the President,' n.p. 16 The issue is complicated and potentially doubly offensive to African Americans because most of them, including Michelle Obama, can lay claim to slave ancestry whereas he cannot. Indeed, during his 2007 election campaign Obama's credibility problems were not confined to the Republican Right (who demanded he produce his birth certificate to prove his American citizenship) but were also a concern among Obama uttered these words the same week the people of Ferguson, Missouri, marched in protest against the police killing of Michael Brown, the state of emergency having been declared just three days before. And so, even as the President tried to represent his pardon to undocumented migrants as part of a national narrative of inclusivity and racial diversity-or rather: precisely because this President sought to do so, the racist nature of the 'nation of immigrants' shibboleth Finally, whether fourth, fifth, and tenth generation Americans can still, in any way, consider themselves 'immigrants' is a question that needs asking too: if they can, then a great many countries in the world today would be entitled to call themselves 'nations of immigrants' as well, and the exceptionalist premise which is so deeply ingrained in American political rhetoric would be exposed for the ideological spin that it is.
The idea is thus fatally flawed as a definition of American national identity, and it is two years'). Unmistakably however, he also satirised early twentieth century nativist discourse ('as long as they come from Northern Europe') and the campaign to Americanise 'the foreign element,' as immigrants were referred to then, which grew up in response to it ('too tired, too poor, or slightly ill'). For, although the Americanisation movement had originally emerged from the settlement houses and had sought to counter nativist arguments for immigration restriction in the 1910s and 20s, the eugenicist view that the new immigrants were of inferior stock to that of the Northern Europeans who had preceded them, informed its widespread campaign to assimilate the newcomers nonetheless. By 1958 however that coercive and eugenicist rhetoric had lost credibility, and so Kennedy could argue that a new immigration policy should be 'generous, it should be fair; it should be flexible.' Like Obama recently, Senator and would-be President Kennedy also included his own history as a descendant of Irish immigrants in his arguments for drastic reform of the National Origins Act and commemorated 'waves of hostility, directed especially at the Irish, who, as Catholics, were regarded as an alien conspiracy' in his book. 21 Following hot on the heels of his well-publicised visit to Ireland in June of 1963, where he was greeted as a national hero, Kennedy's article in the New York Times could then conclude with a rousing call to immigration reform as also a moral 21 That Presidents Bush and Obama thus both spoke and continue to speak of a 'broken immigration system' due to undocumented migration across the Southern border is doubly ironic. First, the 1965 Act has forced what were formerly sojourners and seasonal workers to stay in the U.S., so that their 'illegality' is actually a result of the law changing, rather than a change in labour demand or migrant behaviour. Again, these are complex questions which elicit paradoxical answers, as we shall see.
The dynamic between political discourse and everyday praxis is hard to gauge, the more so because Americanisation in the early twentieth century, as a deliberate effort of nation-building for an industrial and urban society, not only impacted on immigrants but on the native-born as well. 28 Similarly, when reaction against that earlier coercive Americanisation came in the 1970s with the rise of the so called 'white ethnics,' it was the native-born two or more generations on, who asserted (rather than re-discovered) an ethnic difference they themselves had never really lived or been discriminated for-they could claim their Irishness (as former SDS leader Tom Hayden did) or their Italian roots or their Polish ancestry precisely because they were now secure enough in their white and mostly middle class American identities to do so. 29 Both these phenomena were delayed effects of the Americanisation movement and they require further explanation if we are to understand the move from 'a nation of Americans' to 'a nation of immigrants' better than we do at present. In what follows I will suggest that, although the phrase 'we are a nation of immigrants' is quite new, its anxious ideological burden (of creating unity from diversity, e pluribus unum in a modern sense) originates in America's first period of mass immigration from 1880 to 1920. 30 
Americanisation: what was it?
We need to return to the Americanisation movement of the first Roosevelt's time not only to understand the current salience of the 'nation of immigrants' as an ideological formation, but also to appreciate its cross-party, nostalgic appeal to the days of the 'good' immigrant, which informs the current sense of crisis. Unlike today's monocultural, undereducated and overbreeding migrant who refuses to speak English and has crossed the border illegally, or so the story goes, the immigrant of old chose to assimilate to all things American and could not wait for the day he (always he) could 'take out his papers.' Rather like the hard-working, Godfearing and self-motivated migrant whom President Obama would allow to stay in the country rather than see deported, the good immigrants of old were consistently contrasted to the 'melancholic migrant, who holds on to their past culture and to colonies. Since then, it has taken on all sorts of expedient other meanings, of which the most recent is 'out of many [peoples, or ethnicities] one.' Rudolph Vecoli, 'The Significance of Immigration in the Formation of American Identity,' 9. 31 Vecoli reports that this was the consensus by the 1960s, 'Return to the Melting Pot,' 8. their difference,' in Cisneros' words. 32 Why the U.S. across the political spectrum today should want to identify as a 'nation of immigrants' when, at the same time, immigrants legal and illegal are seen as a problem, is a question that can be answered only in politically divergent ways. It is because today's border-crossers remind white liberals of their own destitute immigrant forebears a century ago, whereas to conservative eyes today's migrants cling to their melancholic difference, unlike those who wholeheartedly joined in the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness a century ago. Here, for an example of the latter, is Samuel Huntington, remembering the good old days of a century ago:
Past immigrants wept with joy when, after overcoming hardship and risk, they saw the Statue of Liberty, enthusiastically identified themselves with their new country that offered them liberty, work, and hope; and often became the most patriotic of citizens. . .
However:
By 2000, America was . . . less a nation than it had been for a century. . . . Globalization, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, immigration, subnationalism, and anti-nationalism had battered American consciousness... The teaching of national history gave way to the teaching of ethnic and racial histories. 33 The 'nation of immigrants' Huntington wants to remember was willing to work hard, learn English, play by the rule of law, and most of all: it was grateful for the gift of 32 Cisneros, 'A Nation of Immigrants,' 14. 33 Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? America's Great Debate, [4] [5] entry to the Promised Land. 34 I shall return to the importance of gratitude in a moment; for now, it is important to note two things: one, that Huntington chooses to forget about the impact of the Americanisation movement altogether, representing the 'old' immigrant instead as somehow naturally predisposed to enthusiastic Americanism. Second, revisionist historiography of the past thirty years has amply demonstrated that this immigrant was nothing so simple, so assimilationist and so a priori Americanist as Huntington asserts`; that s/he could appear so in hindsight can only be attributed to wishful thinking and wilful historical amnesia. 35 Both revisionist and right wing historians, however, have tended to underplay the importance of the Americanisation movement in the formation of twentieth and twenty-first century American identities, so it is this that we shall turn to next.
Originating in the settlement movement and reform efforts to clean up inner cities and aid the poor in the 1880s and 90s, the Americanisation impulse of voluntary 34 37 President Bush's Task Force Report recommended much the same multi-level approach for Americanisation in the twenty-first century. 38 See Gabaccia, Immigration and American Diversity. 39 English as 'our common language' and mastery of it as mandatory for citizenship was contested in the early twentieth century campaign and is so now, too. English is not now and has never been the official language of the United States. If Americanisers now and then demand(ed) it, they did so in opposition to others who believed language was not essential to citizenship, or they do so against all evidence that bi-or multilingualism is a greater asset in the globalised world of today than the English-Only advocated by proponents of an official English amendment to the Constitution. 40 Otis L. Graham Jr. and Elizabeth Koed, 'Americanizing the Immigrant, Past and Future: History and Implications of a Social Movement,' 44. 'Radical/terrorist' is an informative slip also because it makes visible just how many parallels those interested in 'intervention to assist assimilation' saw between social divisions in the early twenty first and early twentieth centuries, and why they looked to the these historians' political bias, but it does not invalidate the statement as a whole, which is largely accurate, if not comprehensive.
Historians at the other end of the political spectrum have added an important further dimension to Americanisation as a process, furthermore, in highlighting that the immigrant's successful assimilation also required them to internalise the U.S.'s racial hierarchy and to learn to think of themselves as 'white.' As Matthew Frye Jacobson has observed, it was this which paradoxically produced their descendants' repudiation of the burden of whiteness during the Civil Rights movement of the 1950s and 60s. At that time, Jacobson writes, 'The sudden centrality of black grievance to national discussion prompted a rapid move among [the new, selfidentified] white ethnics to dissociate themselves from white privilege,' citing their lack of connection with slavery on account of their relatively recent arrival in the country as well as the discrimination their parents and grandparents had been greeted with when they first arrived. 41 In advancing his argument about the relation between white ethnics' disavowal of white privilege and the emergence of ethnic pride, Jacobson built on the work of James Barrett and David Roediger, who had earlier demonstrated the mutability of Americanization movement of the 1910s and 20s for inspiration and precedent for such intervention. Unfortunately I have not been able to trace precisely which 'U.S. philanthropic institution' commissioned Graham and Koed's work. It appeared in The Public Historian preceded by an authors' statement explaining the commission and followed by critical 'Reviewers' comments' and 'Client's Evaluation of the Usefulness of the Work Product.' The latter was largely positive; it concluded that 'our foundation will be inclined to look upon assimilation-assisting efforts more favourably than before we commissioned and read this report; ibid' 49. 41 Jacobson, Roots Too, 21. whiteness as a social construction. Because in the early twentieth century the new immigrants had been considered of inferior racial 'stock,' they occupied a place as 'inbetween peoples,' Barrett and Roediger argued, above African Americans but below the native-born descendants of Anglo Europeans. Immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe had not always and already been considered 'white;' they had encountered hostility and discrimination, done worse, harder and lower paid work than native-born whites, been forced into overcrowded slum housing and had suffered routine abuse, being called by the ethnic epithets (hunky dago yid greaser) their grandchildren in the 1970s remembered so well, or worse. 42 Their Americanisation as emancipation over the course of the twentieth century meant moving out of this 'inbetween' status into whiteness and Americanism. 43 
Americanisation demanded conformity to American ways and values in line with
Roosevelt's 100%-ism, but it also promised them incorporation into the polity, including the right to vote and run for office, and these were rights that Native and native-born African Americans had limited or no access to. 44 It therefore endowed them with racial superiority and a social mobility that, again, was largely denied to Native and Black Americans. Henceforth, and as if in anticipation of the legal/illegal dyad of immigration debate today, the 'good' conformist immigrant would be a 42 James R. Barrett and David Roediger, 'InBetween Peoples:" Race, Nationality and the New Immigrant Working Class.' 43 As Ieva Zake has shown for erstwhile Eastern and Central European immigrants, by mid-century 'the anticommunist white ethnics' understanding of themselves as true Americans was partly built on a conflict with ethnic and racial minorities who, according to the white ethnics, were critical because they had failed to appreciate the U.S.' Italics added. Ieva Zake, 'In Search of True Americanness,' 1073. 44 Native Americans were only granted full citizenship with the Snyder or Indian Citizenship Act of 1924.
would-be and should-be American citizen; the 'bad' (remember JFK's words: who 'stole a loaf of bread' or joined a 'questionable organization,' or could not 'document their activities for the past two years') should lose their jobs and return home, or be deported. 45 The purpose of the Americanisation movement by the 1920s was thus a far wider one than its initial agenda of fitting the immigrant to American life and industrial work had suggested; it was to produce a 'one-minded' nation through assimilation of the 'foreign element,' in the parlance of the day, to the Americanist cause. 46 That this cause was not an old, revolutionary and democratic one but, rather, a new Having begun as a local, philanthropic effort to help immigrants settle, the Americanisation movement grew into a state-wide and then an increasingly coercive States-wide programme, involving immigrants and the native-born. Ideologues like Bogardus and Gibbs thus help us see that Americanisation was a project of nationbuilding very broadly conceived, of forging a national consciousness and purposecloaked in the promise of prosperity that 'the American way of life' entails-for a 48 Hartmann, The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant, 235-6; 237. We should be careful, however, to distinguish the red-baiting of this period from that in the Cold War. By 1920, even an enthusiastic Americaniser like Edward Bok could still see the Soviet Union as offering the working man the kind of opportunity hitherto only available in the U.S.: 'Russia may, as I like to believe she will, prove a second United States of America in this respect;' Edward W. Bok divided, recalcitrant and disparate society. Nor was this a society being torn apart by mass immigration; rather, the rifts in the social fabric that needed to be healed, and that the Americanisation campaign sealed over by projecting its attention onto 'the foreign-born,' ran much deeper and were potentially much more disruptive than those caused by the presence of newcomers. 50 [and] that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same.' 55 No wonder then that, after the Johnson Reed Act was passed and the border all but closed to new immigrants in 1924, the loyalty so explicitly demanded of the 'foreign-born' for incorporation into the American polity, now translated into gratitude for the 'gift' of being so included. This 'gift' was made all the more precious for its no longer being available to those of their countrymen and relatives in Russia, Poland and Italy who would have been emigrants to America too, but whose access would now be denied-or deferred for another forty years. 56
The gratitude paradigm
Crucial in my theory that the roots of current ideas of American nationhood lie in the early twentieth century Americanisation campaign is what we might call the 55 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 'Naturalization Oath of Allegiance to the United States of America.' Wikipedia helpfully provides a comparison of oaths of naturalisation in various countries, which reveals that no other is quite so long and so detailed as that of the U.S., and no other demands the renunciation of allegiance to the pledger's country of birth. See Wikipedia 'Oath of Citizenship' https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oath_of_citizenship#United_States. Steven Taylor outlines the legacy of the New England Know Nothings to the Progressive Party, and therefore to Theodore Roosevelt's thinking, in 'Progressive Nativism: The KnowNothing party in Massachusetts.' 56 The Immigration Act of 1924 reduced the number of immigrants to the U.S. to 2% of those of that nationality already living in the country in 1880. In practice this meant that immigration from the new regions (Southern and Eastern Europe) was restricted between 1924 and 1965, when the new Immigration Act was passed, to hundreds per year, in stark contrast to the hundreds of thousands and millions who came in any given year between 1880 and1920. 'gratitude paradigm:' a structure of thinking and feeling about U.S. citizenship that profoundly shapes American patriotism, exceptionalism and, with it, the 'nation of immigrants' idea as an ideological formation. I mean by it the notion that immigrants to the United States now, as well as then, owe America something, that the country-in allowing them entry and eventually citizenship-bestowed a gift on them which needs re-paying with undying love and loyalty. The obvious answer would appear to be that they became part of the world's greatest superpower, but such ostensibly common sense thinking is a-historical. First and second generation immigrants before World War II (think: the Depression) were not part of any superpower, and besides-as Jacobson has shown in Roots Toomany of their grandchildren and great-grandchildren turned against American 64 See, for example, the episode with film director Mike Nichols. Nichols' parents were refugees from Nazi Germany and in light of that particular history the sentiment is understandable-were it not for the fact that the U.S.'s record on accepting Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany before and during World War II is nothing to write home about. According to the Holocaust Museum, only 137,450 Jewish refugees had settled in the U.S. by 1952. Besides, fleeing to the U.S., no less than to other countries like Canada or Argentina, often entailed significant hardship and discrimination for the first generation of Jewish refugees. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 'United States Policy Towards Jewish Refugees, 1941 -1952 immigrant America that had briefly existed at the turn of the twentieth century. 68 In other words, the gratitude paradigm John F. Kennedy had articulated with A Nation of Immigrants was now mobilised to turn ethnic shame into pride ('look how far we have come') and a nation of Americans into one of diverse ethnicities. 69 Because it enables white liberals to celebrate their multicultural tolerance and openness ('we were strangers once, too') and conservatives to honour their forebears' sacrifice (legitimating resentment of the 'ungrateful' immigrants (and African Americans) of today) the 'nation of immigrants' can work wonders: it unites Americans on both sides of the immigration debate across the chasm of racial inequality that would still exclude millions of Black, Native, and Chican@ Americans from the national project. 70
A nation of Americanised immigrants?
Clearly, if we are to understand current American anxiety about mass immigrationwhether addressed in the form of President Obama's deportation deferral or Bush's 68 As if, because this third and fourth generation ethnicity was, as Herbert Gans argued in 1979, now (re)claimed in largely symbolic form, nostalgically as a tradition one could take pride in, but did no longer have to live. See Gans, 'Symbolic Ethnicity: the Future of ethnic groups and cultures in America.' 69 Immigration of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Kennedy wrote, 'gave every old American a standard by which to judge how far he had come and every new American a realization of how far he might go.' A Nation of Immigrants, 99. 70 Jacobson cites David Horowitz in the debate about slave reparations: '. . . as a Jew I owe a debt to America . . . black Americans . . . should feel the same way.' We can take this as an example of the gratitude paradigm in full ideological swing, counting the legacy of slavery as one of the plethora of privileges the U.S. has bestowed on its citizens. Jacobson, Roots Too, 335. second Americanisation initiative-we should remind ourselves of its history. We need to evaluate the success, or otherwise, of organised Americanisation efforts at local, state and federal levels, yet since there is little recent research on the Americanisation movement of a century ago this is not easy to do. What scholarship there is tends to conclude that the movement was short-lived, extreme, and failed to achieve its objectives. 71 71 Many historians of Americanisation take their cue from Edward G. Hartmann's The Movement to Americanize the Immigrant of 1948, the only monograph that, as far as I have been able to ascertain, has ever been published on the early twentieth century movement. Consultation of primary sources such as field reports and the handbooks which were in (mass)circulation at the time (such as Ruby M. Boughman's report on Americanisation in LA and Aronovici and Bogardus, cited above) gives a more contemporaneous view of the depth and reach of the movement on the ground and in action, however. 72 Carlson, 'Americanization,' 452.
historians Graham and Koed viewed as so fortuitous in retrospect, because it enabled (or so they claimed) the restoration of American order and unity. 73 As we have seen however, Carlson's summary of organised Americanisation's short and 'extreme' career underestimates the impact it had on immigrants and natives both; the same can be said of the work of other historians who, from Moynihan and 73 The act stipulated that no more than a 2% equivalent of the number of people of a particular national origin already living in the United States according to 1920 Census figures would be allowed entry per year. In practice, this quota system heavily favoured those of Irish, German, and UK origin; according to Desmond King these countries accounted for 'about 70 percent of the annual quota of approximately 158.000. ' King, The Liberty of Strangers, 60. 74 See for a good selection of critical perspectives on this notoriously slippery concept Michael Kazin and Joseph A. McCartin eds. Americanism.
Even if the movement to impose it was relatively short-lived and may now be considered 'extreme,' Americanisation as a discourse was well-nigh inescapable in the first two decades of the twentieth century, and it did not stop suddenly in 1924, even if many of the free provisions of the movement did (such as night school classes in English, or courses in American-style cooking and childcare).
In practice and as a norm to aspire to, Americanisation was a deliberate and wideranging project in social engineering that had real effects on real people. 75 Reaching into their workplaces, their schools, their homes and kitchens and ultimately their individual psyches, the conception of American identity forged and promulgated in the Americanisation campaign, in terms of the skills, values, behaviour and political conviction outlined above, impressed itself upon immigrant and native hearts and minds and took hold there for most of the twentieth century-and beyond. 76 Organised Americanisation of the teens and twenties then, I want to stress, is not some footnote to immigration history, epitomised in its extremity by the Ford Motor Company's staging of its English School graduation ritual, in which workers of various national origins jumped into the melting pot and came out transformed into uniformly clad model Americans. 77 Instead, as Michael Olneck has observed, 75 Many immigrant autobiographies of the period for example measured the narrator/author's 'progress' by the extent of their Americanisation; The Americanization of Edward Bok, the Autobiography of a Dutch Boy Fifty Years After of 1920, for example, epitomised this phenomenon. Like Mary Antin's more ambivalent The Promised Land, Bok's book quickly became a bestseller and was used by the Americanisation campaign as an exemplary text in civics classes. 76 We might think here of the resurgence of a rabid 'patriotic' nationalism and concurrent xenophobia in the wake of 9/11, of which the Tea Party's demand that President Obama submit his birth certificate was a delayed and extreme expression. 'who we are' as people who do not deport immigrants, because 'we were strangers once too.' Rather, it was and is about tracing back the history of that strangeness and that promise, and re-examining the terms and conditions with which it came.
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